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INTRODUCTION

Are universities schools? The question seems almost silly to ask: o f
course universities are schools. They have teachers and students, like
schools. They have grades, like schools. There are classes and extracurricular
activities, also like schools. But recent writings on the issue o f 04 free speech
on campus" have raised the improbable specter that universities are less
educational institutions than they are public forums like parks and sidewalks,
where a free-wheeling exchange o f ideas and opinions takes place,
unrestricted by any sense o f academic mission or school disciplinc. 1 Some
• Copyright <O2018 by Chad Flanders, Professor of L.1w, St Louis University School of Law.
Those who have read the work of Robert Post and Jacob Levy on this subject will recognize the
debt I have to them. I especially relied on Robert Post's The Classic First Amendment Tradition
Under Stress: Freedom of Speech and the University (unpublished manuscript),
https:l/papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm'!abstract_id=3044434 and Jacob Levy's Safe Spaces,
Academic Freedom, and the University as a Complex Association, Lecture at Georgia State
University
(Feb.
15.
2016)
(transcript
available
at
http://blcedingheartlibertarians.com/2016/03/safe-spaces-acadcmic-freedom-and-the-univcrsity•
as-a-complex-association/). I first tested some of these ideas in an op-ed several years ago. See
Chad Flanders, Opinion. Oklahoma Frat Ca. c Tm1cl1cs ml a S11prisi11g/_v Murky Arca of Law,
CLEVELAND
(Mar.
27,
2015,
11:13
AM),
https :!/www .cleveland.comfopinionlindex.ssl/20 I 5/03/oklahoma_ frat_case _touches_on.html.
Thanks to John lnazu for conversations on the topics in this essay, and to Ash Bhagwat, Scan
Oliveria, Will Boude, and Morgon Hazelton for comments on a previous draft. All errors arc my
own.
I See, for example, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILL"1AN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS
62-63 (2017), which states: "[l]nstitutions of higher education can either protect an orthodoxy
against challenge or be willing to pcnnit all ideas; . . . Either there is complelc protection for the
expression of all ideas and views, or there is an onhodoxy of belief. . . . We beliew t/rere is 110
middle gro1111d." (emphasis added). For a discussion of commentators who apply generic First
137
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of this rhetoric is o f course exaggerated, and some of it can be taken out o f
context.1 Nonetheless, the overall impression is that public universities are
required to host and accommodate all viewpoints, no matter how loathsome,
and protect any expression in any place and at any time or else risk running
afoul of the First Amendment.3
There is reason to take this position seriously. Academic commentators
have been quick to appeal to cases dealing with true public forums (streets
and parks4) to reject many types of limits on speech at the university level. 5
They have argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on hate speech, 6
fighting words, 7 true threats, 8 and incitement, 9 should control with regard to
campus speech, rather than its decisions dealing with educational
Amendment doctrine 10 universities nllher than using school-speech cases. sec i,rfra note 10.
1 For example, Chcmcrinsky and Gillman end up tempering their "stark choice" later in their
book by distinguishing spaces within an institution of higher education where speech can and
cannot be regulated. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN,supra note 1, al 112 (drawing a distinction
between the "professional" and "free sp -cch" zones 111colleges 11nd universities). For another
e11ample o f this, compare DcJofm v, Temple U11iversity, 537 F.3d 301, 315 (3d Cir. 2008)
("Discussion by adult students in a college classroom should 1101 be restricted." (emphasis added))
with id. al 316 ("Accordingly, in detcnnining whether Temple University's policy passes
constitutional muster under our reasoning in Saxe, we keep in mind that Temple's administrators
arc granted fess leeway in regulating student speech than arc public elementary or high school
administralors." (emphasis added)).
3 See Post, supra note •, at 9-11 (citing sources that say allempts 10 limit campus speech
violate the First Amendment); see also Opinion, The Free Speech-Hate Speech Trade-Off, N.Y.
1
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https: /www .nytimcs,com. 2017109/13/opinion/bcrkcley-dcan-erwin•
chemcrinsky.html (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky saying, "[i]t is important to recognize that a public
university has no choice but to allow speakers on campus even if their message is regarded as
hateful or racist." (emphasis added)); id. ("The central principle of the First Amendment-and o f
academic freedom-is that all ideas and views can be expressed. Sometimes they are ideas and
views that we might consider noble, that advance equality. Sometimes they might be ideas that we
abhor.").
,1 Traditional public forums, such as streets and parks, "have immemorially been held in trust
for the use o f the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Hague v. Comm. for
Indus. Org.• 307 U.S. 496, SIS (1939).
S See Robert C. Post, There fs No /st .-lmendme,rt Right to Speak on a College Camp11s, VOX
(Dec. 31, 2017, I I :33 AM), h11ps:!/www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/I0/25/16526442/tirstamcndment-college-campuses-milo-spcncer-protcsts ("Underlying Chemerinsky's post is the
assumption that speech within the university (and outside the classroom) is the same as in the public
sphere.").
6 R.A.V. v. City o f St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (proscribing state prohibitions of biasmotivated expressive conduct so as not lo offend the First Amendment).
7 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that stales can regulate the
use of"fighting words" without offending the First Amendment).
8 Walls v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (holding that a statute prohibiting threats upon
the President's life should not be applied so as to suppress free speech).
9 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that, while stales can prohibit
speech that is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action," they cannot prohibit
speech that merely advocates for the use o f force generally).
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institutions.' 0 The Supreme Court's few decisions on the rights o f university
students have helped fuel the analogy between universities and public
forums. In one case, the Court went so far as to write that "the precedents of
this Court leave 110 room for the view that, because of the acknowledged
need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on
college campuses than in the community at large. "11 The classroom, Justice
Powell went on to state, is quintessentially the "marketplace o f ideas." 12
All o f this, however, ignores the fact that universities arc not public
forums, but schools-with classes and teachers, final exams, and grades.
While the Supreme Court has occasionally engaged in rhetorical excess in
older cases, u the Court has never explicitly ruled that its classic public school
decisions-Tinker, 14 Hazebvood, 1s Fraser, 16 and, most recently, Morse 11lo See, e.g., Scan Clark, Miscnncep11'o1LrAbout the Fighti11g Wordr £xceptio11, FIRE (Sept. 20,
2006 ), https:/fwww .thefire.orgfmisconccptions-about•thc• fighting •words-cxcc:ption/
("It now
seems clear that lewd, vulgar, or profane speech doesn't fall within the fighting words exception.
But someone forgot to tell college administrators . , . . "); Zach Greenberg, Rcjecti11g the 'Heckler's
Veto,· FIRE (June 14, 2017), hnps://www .thefire.org/rejecting-the-hecklcrs-veto/ ("Unfortunately,
many colleges have recently ratified the heckler's veto by canceling events fearuring invited
speakers in response to actual or perceived threats o f violence or other disruption."): George Leef,
The 'Right' to Disntpt Free Speech 011 Campris-lt Does,r 't £tis/, FORBES (Jan. S, 2018, 7:52 AM),
hups:!/www.fornes.com/sites/george leef/20 18/0 \ /05 lthe-right-to-disrupt-free-speech-on-campusit-doesnt-exist (applying non-school cases to controversies regarding university speech); Jesse
Singal, There Have Been So Mu,r_v Bud Lefty Free.Speeclr Takes La1e(1•, N.Y. MAG.: DAILY
INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 12, 2017, 8:30 PM), http:flnymag.com/daily/intclligencer/2017/l l/therch.lve-been-so-many-bad-leliy-frce-spcech-takes-lately.html;
Geoffrey R. Stone, Opinion. Richard
Spencer's Righi to Speak at A11bt1rn,
N.Y.
TIMES
18,
2017),
(Apr.
https :1/www .nytimes.com/20 17 f04/ I 8fopinion/richard-spencers-right-to-speak-at-aubum.html
(opining that the First Amendment prevents universities from engaging in viewpoint
discrimim1tion ).
11 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (emphasis added) (holding that college may have
violated Petitioners' First Amendment rights when it declined to recognize a local chapter o f
Students for a Democratic Society as a campus organization). The decision in Healy is surprisingly
ambiguous: the end result was a remand to detennine whether the student group was in fact willing
to abide by "reasonable" university regulntions. Id. at 170. It was by no means an unambiguous
victory for the studenl group.
I:! Id. at 180 (internal quotations omitted),
13 See especially the Healy and Papislr cases discussed i11fra Part I.
14 Tinker v. Des Moines lntlcp. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding
Constitutional protection for a protest by Iowa public school students who wore black annbands in
opposition to the Government's Vietnam policy).
IS Hazelwood Sch, Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (high school principal did not
violate respondents' First Amendment rights by withholding select articles from public:ition in the
school newspaper).
16 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 ( 1986) (holding that School District acted
consistently with the First Amendment when it disciplined respondent for giving a lewd spcc:ch at
a school-sponsored assembly).
17 Morse v, Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (holding that school officials did not violate the
First Amendment when they confiscated srudent's pro-drug banner and suspended him).
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are limited only to schools other than universities. 18 And, although it is
sensible to see distinctions between high schools and universities, the most
accurate way to characterize the difference between high schools and
universities is that they are points on a continuum. Just as it would be wrong
to ignore the differences between high schoolers and university students (or
between elementary and middle school students), 19 it would also be wrong
to ignore the similarities between the institutions and the actors involved, or
what the Tinker Court called the "special characteristics of the school
environment."20 It is not a matter of there being an "on/off switch," as one
court called it, 21or a "stop-go distinction" in the words of another. 22
Much modern commentary underplays the fact that the difference
between schools is one of de1,1Tee and not of kind. 23The goals of a university
qua school do not differ radically from those of a high school, nor are the
problems and challenges faced by the two types of institutions entirely
distinct. They both, in the words of one opinion, have to deal with students. 24
When we realize this, the nature of the First Amendment challenge in this
area becomes clearer. The First Amendment challenge does not consist of
18 See, e.g., Ha=elwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7 (1988) ("A number o f lower federal courts
have . . . recosruzed that educators' decisions with regard to the content of school-sponsored . . .
expressive activities arc entitled to substnntinl deference. We need not now decide whether the
same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities al
the . . . university level." (citations omitted)); see also Michael K. Park, Re.ftricti11g Ano11y111011s
"li'k Yak": The C,mslil11tio11ality o f Reg11/ati11g S111dents' OJJ-Campris 011/i11e Speech i11 11,e Age o f
Social Media, S2 WILLAMETTE L . REV. 40S, 427-28 (2016) ("Unfortunately, the Court has never
definitively answered the question as to whether the general rules applicable under standard First
Amendment doctrine would apply in the snme way in the university context"). See ge11eral{I' John
Jn.1zu, Tire P11rposc (a11d Limits) of1l,c U11i1•ersity 14-17 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies
Rescnrch Paper No. 18-02-03), hnps://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=313038 l
(noting that lower courts have been "less than clear" in deciding whether the free speech standards
of the Ti11ker line of cases apply in the university selling, and collecting citations).
19 See Walker-Serrano v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 416-17 (3d Cir. 2003) ("There cnn be little
doubt that speech appropriate for eighteen-yenr-old high school students is not necessarily
acceptable for seven-year-old grammar school students.").
20 Tinkerv. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,506 (1969) ("First Amendment
rights, applied in light o f the special characteristics of the school environment, arc available to
teachers and students.").
21 Hosty v. Caner, 412 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 200S) ("[Ha=elwood] does not even hint at the
possibility of nn on/off switch: high-school papers rcviewable, college pnpers not rcviewable. It
addrcsses degrees o f deference.").
22 Wnrd v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733-34 (6th Cir. 2012) ("Nothing in Ha=elwood suggests a
stop-go distinction between student speech at the high-school and university levels, and we decline
to create one.").
23 See discussion infra Pan I. See also Tracey Wirmnni, Nole, Tinker Takes on Tatro: Tire
Minnesota Supreme Court's MLued Oppor11111ity, 65 OKLA. L . REV. 769, 783 (2013) ("The Ti11ker
test was desi g n ed to only assess the speech of primnry nnd secondary students and is premised on
the in loco parcntis theory; thus, it is inapplicable in the university conlcxt."); see also infra notes
26 & 28.
24 See il,fra note 89.
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applying public forum doctrine to a place that is not a public forum (the
university); it consists o f appropriately translating the principles o f Ti11ker et
al. to colleges and universities.25 In facing this challenge, the decisions by
circuit courts dealing with high school and middle school students are
helpful. Although the holdings in those cases should not be imported
wholesale to cases involving universities, 26 they can give us guidance as to
what the stakes are and how universities might handle the difficult issues o f
hate speech, harassment, and bias. 27 Only if we saw a clear break-rather
than a sort o f continuity-between grade schools and universities, would we
would reject this line o f inquiry. But taking that view would be a mistakc. 28
My short essay has three parts. In the first part, I examine and explain
the rhetoric advancing what I call the "break" view o f speech at universities,
which situates universities as types o f institutions that are more similar to
traditional public forums than they are to high schools or middle schools. In
the second part, I look at how lower courts have applied the principles o f the
Court's educational cases (the Tinker line) in contexts other than universities
to see how the weighing and balancing o f interests proceeds in those cases.
In the third part, I argue for the "continuity" view, which advocates for
applying the Tinker line o f cases to universities in a way that takes seriously
the idea that universities are in fact schools and not pure "marketplaces o f
ideas," where speech generally goes unregulated, and restrictions on speech
can only be made in the face o f imminent threats.
25 See, e.g., Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 340 (6th Cir. 2010) (Rogers, J., concurring) ("Thus
drug use may be advocated on the streets and in the public square, but not in the public schools.
Similarly, racial contempt can be advocated on the streets and in the public square, but not
necessarily in the public schools.").
26 See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights o f Unil'ersity Studcllls, IOI MINN.
L. REV. 1801, 1852 (2017) ("It is generally agreed thal colleges and universities no longer have a
custodial relationship with their students . . . the wholesale application of the Court's K-12
jurisprudence would make little sense . . . . ").
21 For a good overview, see generally Kevin W. Saunders. Hare Speech ill the Schools: A
Pot,mtial Clumge in Directio11, 64 ME. L. REV. 165 (2011) (arguing that modem Supreme Court
decisions proscribing hate speech are consistent wilh its earlier precedents, such ns Ti11ker).
28 A version o f the kind o f non sequitur I mean to combat seems present in a recent essay by
Clay Calvert. Clay Calvert, Reco11sideri11g lt1citeme111, Tinker a11d the Heckler's Velo 011 College
Campuses: Richard Spe11cerand the Charlolles,•il/e Factor, 112 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 109, 123
(2018),
= l 2S4& context=nulr_
https://scholnrlycommons.law.northwestemcdu/cgi/viewcontcnt.cgi?articlc
online&previcw_modc=l&z=l516859046 ("[F]rom a free-speech perspective . . . reducing the
First Amendment rights of university students . . . to those o f high school pupils by vesting
university officials with a test devised for high schools . . . su!Tocate[s] free expression. Therefore,
Ti11ker slio11ld not he 11sed hy 1111iversi1ies a.r a root to squelch speech . . . . " (emphasis added)
(citations omilled)). But Calvert moves too quickly-he goes from noting that high-school and
university students arc different to the idea that Tinker should not be used in the university setting
at all because doing so would be to "suffocate" or "squelch" speech. Id.; see aim id. at 117
(asserting that applying Ti11ker to public universities is "misguided").
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I
UNIVERSITIES A S UNIQUE ( T H E "BREAK." V I E W )

The idea that there is a profound conceptual •·break" between the high
school environment and a college or university environment represents not
so much a legal doctrine as a vision of what university life is (or should be)
like. Thus, it is a little misleading when those arguing for a maximum freespeech view of the university say that their position is rooted in doctrine or
more simply, in "the law." 19 While there certainly is some law that counsels
treating universities like public forums, 30 this point of view also stems from
a broader normative ideal about what should be happening at the university.
Those who see the university as a public forum have an "idea of a
university," as we might put it, invoking Cardinal Newman's famous book31-and even a conception of the university's mission, which might involve the
cultivation of a certain free-wheeling ethos, where tolerance is demanded
and offense expected. On this view, the university-far from being the next
modest step away from high school-is a place where children suddenly
become adults, where students at once convert into citizens, and where, both
inside and outside the university, there is debate and dissensus, and
conformity is questioned (if not quashed altogether). 32 "Break" proponents
foel that those who attend college or university should be expected to be
exposed to a wide variety of ideas,33 to be challenged, and to even be shocked
29 See, e.g.• Erwin Chemennsky, Hate Speech ls Protected Free Speech. Even on College
2017, 4:33
Campuses,
Vox
(Dec.
26,
AM).
https:/.'www.vox.com/1he-big•

iden/2017110/25/16524832/campus-frce-speech-first-amendment-protest ("The Supreme Coun
repeatedly has s.iid that the First Amendment means public institutions cannot punish speech. or
exclude speakers, on the grounds that it is hateful or deeply offensive. This includes public colleges
and universities."). It is misleading in another respect as well: it presupposes what doctrinal
resources we should use. As I argue later, the correct doctrine to apply is the Tinker line of cases,
rather than public forum cases. See i,ifra Pan Ill.
JO See, e.g.• Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667,671 (1973) (finding
that universities do not create a "dual standard" for free speech); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180
(1972) ("[U]niversities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.").
l l JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY DEFINED AND ILLUSTil.ATED: IN NINE
DELIVERED
THE
DISCOURSES
TO
CATIIOLICS
OF
DUBLIN
(2008),
http:'/www.gutenberg.org/Ii les/24 526/24526-pd f. pdf.
32 For a good statement of this kind o f vision. see Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein.
A C/ose-11p, Modern Look at First Amendment Academic Freedom Rig/its o f Public College

S111de11ts a11d Faculty, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1943, 1954 (2017) (intcrnnl citations omitted) ("The
function o f the universily isn't to instill orthodoxy; it is to encourage inquiry and debate in the
unfettered marketplace of ideas. Students need some degree o f academic freedom to develop the
creativity and analytic skills that arc necessary to develop new knowledge and engage an
increasingly changing world."). B111 see id. at 1955 (articulating the "contrary argument" that
meaningful inquiry and debate in colleges may "require orchestration").
l l See, e.g.. McCauley v. Univ. of the V.l., 618 F.3d 232, 244 (3d Cir. 2010) ("Modem-day
public universities are intended to function as marketplaces o f ideas, where students interact with
each other and with their professor.; in a collnbomtivc learning environment.").
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or insulted. 34 The response to these challenges and insults should not be to
suppress speech or to restrict it, but to respond to it with more speech. 35
There are limits universities can apply to speech, even on the "break"
view, and they come in two broad sorts. The first sort is those limits that
would ordinarily apply to speech-even to a rally in a public park or to
someone delivering a speech on a public sidewalk-that is, to speech in
traditional public forums. It almost goes without saying that universities can
prohibit speech that incites others to lawlessness, that threatens others, or
involves "fighting words." These types of speech can be limited in
universities because they can be limited anywhere.36 Sometimes these lines
(where permissible speech shades into the impermissible) will be hard to
draw, but the line drawing here is no different than the line drawing that has
to be done in other contexts-such as when advocacy crosses the line into
incitement, or when a reasonable person would perceive something as a
threat. ln the same vein, universities can put reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on speech, just as the government can generally put
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in public forums. 37
So students cannot have protests that obstruct the operation of the university,
hold the university administration building hostage with a protest, or have a
rally at the same time as a basketball game. 38 But these are actually no
34 See, e.g., Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d 602,627 (E.D.
Va. 2016) ("[C]ontroversial and sometimes offensive ideas and viewpoints arc central to the
educational mission o f universities. It follows that university students cannot thrive without a
certain thickness of skin that allows them lo engage with expressions that might cause 'distress' or
'discomfort□•.... ").
35 Sec Written Statement from David L . Hudson. Jr., Ombudsman. Newscum Institute First
Amendment Center, to the Judiciary Committee of the United States House o f Representatives,
Subcomminee on the Constitution nnd Civil Justice (Apr.4.2017), https:/ljudiciary.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/festimony-Hudson-04.04.2017.pdf ("When dealing with controversial
speakers who will offend others, college and university officials should embrace and advance the
counter-speech principle rather than resort to silencing and disinviting controversial speakers. Only
in a true emcrgem:y should they reson to more drastic measures.").
36 Universities can regul:ite these "c:itegories" of speech because, in general, they are
categorical "exceptions" to the protections of the First Amendment. See United Stales v. Stevens.
559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (20 I 0). These are the categories o f speech for which, according to the Court,
there is a long history o f permissible regulation. Id.
37 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("Our cases make clear, however,
that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place,
or manner of protected speech . . . . ").
38 Fwn i f all uf a university is ,I publil:: forum and hcst analyzed in !hose tcm1s-holh of which
I doubt-the uni\'crsity is still entitled tu place reasonable time. place, 11nd m,umcr ri:strictions on
speech in th,1t fonirn. provi1kJ 1hose restriction. arc not contclll•huscd . .'foe:, c g .• Bowman v. White,
444 F.3d 967. 980 (8th Cir. 2006) (upon finding that a university's outdoor areas were unlimited
designated public forums, the court ascertained that "the Policy impennissibly rcstrain[ed] free
expression" by "nnalyz[ing] the University's time, place, and manner restrictions using the
appropriate scrutiny standard, which requirc[d] a restriction on speech to be content-neutral and
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest"). Spaces in the university that are
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different than limitations on occupying the mayor's office or having a rally
at a park when the park is closed. 39 These "ordinary" limits on speech (the
first sort of limit on speech I am considering) are compatible with an
emphasis, indeed an insistence, that speech at a university be uninhibited and
robust to the greatest extent possible. 40 The reasonable and acceptable limits
we can put on traditional public forums can apply to universities as well,
which in their own way (according to the "break" ideal) are a kind of public
forum.
If the first broad set of limits is not unique to the university qua
university, the second set is. Unlike a traditional public forum, the university
is not wholly made up of public spaces; it also includes classrooms, where
instruction occurs. In the classroom, there are limits on student expression.
For example, a student can of course be marked down (and even disciplined}
if he writes an essay on the Super Bowl, when the assignment is to write on
Shakespeare's Hamlet. 4 1 Or, to take a slightly less extreme example, a
teacher can foil a student paper that expresses the "opinion" that World War
[I was started by the Illuminati, or that Pearl Harbor was faked. This would
be viewpoint discrimination in any other context: a person is being
discriminated against for expressing a particular point of view that the
teacher (an actor employed by the state42) disagrees with. 43 Such "viewpoint
discrimination" has to be acceptable if a university is going to have any

nonpublic have a greater leeway in regulating on the basis o f content, and can even restrict speech
altogether. See Gilles v. Blanchard, 477 F.3d 466,471 (7th Cir. 2007) ("Vincennes University has
placed the lawn completely off limits to uninvited outsiders . . . . Confining solicilalions to the
walkway in front of the student union is entirely nppropriatc . . . . Letting solicitors into the middle
of the cnmpus would disrupt the cnmpus atmosphere.").
39 See Chcmerinsky, supra nole 29 ("Even though there is a First Amendment righl lo speak,
that docs not mean that protesters have the right to demonstrate in the middle ofa freeway nt rush
hour. A campus surely could prohibit a large demonstration in a classroom building while classes
arc in session.").
40 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("Thus we consider lhis case
against the backb'rtlund of a profound national commitmcnl to the principle lhat debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehemenl, caustic,
and somelimcs unpleasamly sharp an:icks on government and public officials.").
41 See Posl, supra note S ("If I am leaching n course on constitutional law, my students had
better discuss constitutional law and not the World Series.").
42 Hayut v. State Univ. ofN.Y., 3S2 F.3d 733, 744 (2d Cir. 2003) ("We think it clear that a
professor employed at a slate university is a state actor.").
43 "Content-based discrimination" occurs when the state restricts speech based on the subject
matter of that speech. "Viewpoint-based discrimination" is a particular type of content-based
discrimination: it is when the state restricts 011c side of a debate on a particular lopic. See, cg.,
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. o f Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 ( 1995) ("Viewpoint
discrimination is thus an egregious fonn o f content discrimination. The government must abstain
from regulating speech when the specific motiv:iting ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker is the rationale for the restriction.").
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educational function, as opposed to being a free-for-all. 44 It has to be
permissible for teachers to convey some sense that theirs is the right (or just
the better informed) view and that students should strive to emulate it. 45 No
classroom can be a true marketplace of ideas, where the test of truth is not
some established standard, but whatever gets accepted by the "consumers."
Classrooms, in this sense, are far from being unregulated markets, where
anyone is free to speak about anything, and the test of truth is what gets
accepted by the majority.
Still, "break" proponents view restrictions on classroom speech as, in
some sense, anomalous. 46 Although there have to be some limits in the
university classroom, it still should approximate a sort o f marketplace, where
students are exposed to a variety o f different ideas, and where they express
contrarian points o f view and challenge the teacher rather than blindly follow
the teacher's lead. 47 Certainly, according to "break" proponents, outside the
classroom, the ideal o f the marketplace should rule-here is where the only
limits are pretty much the limits o f the traditional public forum.48 Student
groups should be many and pluralistic. Invited speakers should come from
all over the political and ideological spectrum. Those speakers should
provoke and even "incite," in the sense o f inspiring opposition and
contestation from the student body. 49 The university administration should
44 Sec Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1857 ("Applying standard First Amendment doctrine to
these decisions would be vinunlly impossible and inconsistent with the academic enterprise.").
45 Sec Settle v. Dickson Cty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1995){"[T]eachers . . .
must daily decide which arguml!nts are relevant, which computations arc correct, which analogies
arc good or bad, and when it is time to stop writing or talking . . . . [l]n a word to encourage speech
germane to the topic at hand and discourage speech unlikely to shed light on lhe subject.").
46 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note I, at 113 ("Colleges and universities con
never punish the expression of ideas. The very core ofa university's mission requires protection of
all views, no matter how objectionable or offensive they may be to some students and faculty.").
47 For support for this vision in n judicial opinion, see Hosty v. Carter, 4 I 2 F.3d 73 I. 741 (71h
Cir. 2005) (Wood. J .. dissenting) ("A university has a dilTerent purpose-to expose students lo a
'marketplace o f ideas."').
48 See. e.g., Papandrea, supra note 26, nt 1858 ("Professors and universities should not be
given broad power to restrict speech outside of the classroom setting unless that speech is
unprotected speech . . . or meets the 'severe and pervasive' and 'objectively olTensivc' standard for
hostile learning environment claims under Title VI or Title IX.").
49 Sec Larry Atkins, There Should Be Free Speech on College Camp11res for Conrervative
S111dc11ts, Conservative Speakers. a11d Liberal Professors, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 28, 2017, 9:21
AM), https:Nwww.huffinglonpost.com/entrylthere-should-be-frce-specch-on-college-campusesfor_us_59a4144fe4b0a62d0987b0b3 ("Universities shouldn't shelter students and protect them in
a liberal bubble. It's good for them to be exposed to ideas that might differ from theirs."); Amy X.
Wang. This Is 11'1,_v Nazi Speakers Should Be Alloll'ed lo Come lo College Campuses, QUARTZ (Oct.
12. 2017),
https:l'/qz.com/ 1100921/frce-speech-a-stat-shows-why-nazi-spenkers-should-be-ollowed-ontocollcge-campuscs/ ("[T)here is value yet in leuing polarizing figures-however seemingly
discrimina1ory, racist, or otherwise offensive they are-come to campus."). But c f Aaron R.
Hanlon, Why Colleges H a w a Right w Rl{je, ·t Hatefi1l Speakers Like A1111 Cu11lter, NEW REPUBLIC
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be largely hands-off, intervening only when there is no other opportunity to
avoid a threat, harassment, or imminent lawless action.
This vision of the university finds support in two relatively neglected
U.S. Supreme Court cases, Healy and Papish. 50 Healy concerned a restriction
on a student group, a chapter of the national group Students for a Democratic
Society (SOS). In upholding the associational rights of the group, the Court
expressed strong support for viewing the university as a public forum for
First Amendment purposes. Citing the famous admonition of the Tinker
court, which announced that students and teachers do not shed their First
Amendment rights at the schoolhouse gate, the Court dismissed the view that
colleges and universities could be "enclaves" where the First Amendment
did not apply. 5 1 But the Healy Court took it one step further than Tinker: It
held that the First Amendment should apply with no "less force" at a
university than "in the community at large."52 This is the apotheosis of the
"break" ideal of colleges and universities: the First Amendment applies
equally in universities as it docs outside of them. Even further-and almost
to the point of absurdity-the Hea(v Court endorsed the idea that "the college
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of
ideas. "'53 A later case, Papish, while not as emphatic as Hea(v, goes out of
its way to endorse Healy's vision and seemingly condone the argument that
the only "legitimate" regulations in a university are "reasonable" time, place,
and manner restrictions. 54
It is possible to exaggerate the importance of Hea(v and Papislt. They
arc 1970s opinions that seem to reflect some of the tumult and division of
that era; the prose is sometimes purple, especially the concurring opinion of
Justice Douglas in Healy, which is strongly in the key of the counterculture. ss
Indeed, it may be that on(v Justice Douglas fully subscribes to the utopian
(Apr. 24, 2017), https://newrepublic.comlarticlell422181colleges-right-reject-hateful-speakerslikc-ann-coultcr ("To treat the open forum o f the classroom or the campus like just another town
square-and thus to explain value judgment and knowledge prioritization on campus in tenns of
censorship or 'shutting down' speech-is misguided.").
si Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 ( 1973); Healy v. fames,
408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
JI Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. S03. SI I (1969) ("In our system,
state-operated schools may not be enclaves oftota!il:lrianism . . . . Students in school as well as out
of school are 'persons• under our Constitution.").
si Healy, 408 U.S. at 180-81,
JJ Id. (emphasis added).
54 Papisl, involved the distribution of a newspaper on campus, and the majority in lhnt case
allowed that a university could place restrictions on "the time, place, and manner" o f the
newspaper's distribution. Papish, 4 JO U.S. at 670.
55 Sec, e.g.• Stephen Botcin. Two Judges, Two C11lt11rcs,84 YALE L.J. ISi, 156 (1974) (book
review) (noting Ooughls's "llirtatious use o f radical vocabulary from the late 1960's" in his
autobiography).
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"break" view in its fullest extent: Universities exist to foment "rebellion,"
"ferment," and shake society out o f its traditions, or else they risk becoming
"useless appendages" to the status quo.56 Moreover, the relevance of Hea(v
and Papish to the broader "free speech on campus" debate may be limited.
The newspaper in Papish ("The Free Press Underground") was not produced
or subsidized by the university (although the student who ran it was enrolled
at the university), and so could quite rightly claim that it should not fall under
university rules. And the result in Hea(v, which dealt with whether the SOS
should be recognized as an official student group at the university, was not a
total win for the SOS. The Court remanded for further fact finding on
whether the SOS had expressed an unwillingness to follow a rule requiring
them to "abide by reasonable campus . . . regulations." 57 Depending on the
content o f those permissible "regulations," the actual freedom for student
campus groups could be quite narrow, as perhaps the Court's more recent
case in Christian Legal Society demonstrated.SR
II

T H E REGULATION OF HIGH S C H O O L S

In contrast with the free speech utopia that "break" proponents envision
for universities, the regulation of high schools in the past several decades can
come to seem nearly draconian. Tinker-the foundational case concerning
the right to free speech for high school students-is remembered for being
strongly pro-free speech, and it is.59 However, Tinker contemplated a
potentially wide range of permissible restrictions on free speech, which are
no less a part of its holding. Nothing in Tinker was meant to overthrow "the
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials . . . to prescribe

S6 Hca(,•, 408 U.S. at 197 (Douglas, J., concuning) ("Without ferment of one kind or another,
a college or university (like a federal agency or other human institution) becomes a useless
appendage 10 a society which traditionally has reflected the spirit o f rebellion.").
57 Hca(i•, 408 U.S. at 193-94; see also id. ("Assuming the existence o f a valid rule, however,
we do conclude chat the benefits o f participation in the internal life of the college community may
be denied to any group that reserves the right to violate any valid campus rules with which it
disagrees."). The limitations on what "rules" a campus could pass is left unclear by the opinion. It
could be that the only valid rules for student associations are in fact those that arc consistent with
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, but the Court did not say as much.
58 In this case, a Christian student group was denied official recognition by the university
because it did nor-the university claims-abide by its nondiscrimination policy. Christian Legal
Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. o f Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661,696 (2010).
59 In an especially emphatic passage, the Court wrote; "In our system. students may not be
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate. . . . In
the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech. students
arc entitled 10 freedom of expression o f their views." Tinker v. Des Moines lndcp. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 511 ( 1969).
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and control conduct in the schools." 60 Under Tinker, student speech that
"materially and substantially disrupt[s]" school activities can be regulated
and even sanctioned. 61 So too can speech that infringes on the rights of other
students, however this might be interpreted. 62 Most broadly, speech that
"substantially interferc[s] with" the school's interest in "discipline" can also
be restricted. 63 It is unclear how, exactly, to distinguish each of these three
formulations. The first and third may end up being equivalent-"discipline"
can be read as part of what is necessary to prevent disruption to school
activities. What does seem separate is the question of when speech not only
interferes with classroom or other school functions, but also with the rights
of other students. Indeed, lower courts have seen these as distinct standards. 64
If Tinker itself contains the seeds of potentially broad regulation of
speech in high schools, later Supreme Court cases would see further grounds
for limiting student speech. One such case, F raser,65 allowed vulgar or
offensive speech to be restricted, although it is usually seen as a bizarre,
unprincipled decision (even by members of the Court66) . Another case,
Haze/wood, 61 gave schools the power to censor speech made by students, so
long as that speech is part of a school-sponsored, school-created activity. 68
A third case, Morse, 69 expanded and clarified the power of schools to punish
speech along two dimensions: first, as against drug-related (or drugpromoting) speech; and second, as against speech occurring during offcampus activities. All of these decisions can be seen as making rather narrow
holdings: Fraser limited to dirty words, Hazelwood to school newspapers
and Morse to drugs. But all o f these cases undoubtedly have language in

60 Id. al 507.
61 id. ill 513.
62 /d.
63 Id. at SOS, 509, 511.
64 See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1175 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated,
549 U.S. 1262 (2007) (relying on che provision in Tinker aboul the rights of other students in
conu-a:;t to the districl court's reliance on 1he "substantial disruption" provision); id. 11t 1180 n.21
("The two Ti11ker prongs are slated in the alternative.").
6S Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (restricting lewd or vulgar
speech).
66 As Justice Roberts pul ii in his opinion, "The mode of analysis employed in Fraser is not
entirely clear." Morse: v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,404 (2007).
67 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (approving rescriccions on
speech in the conlext of an evcnl thal is school-sponsored, provided the restriction is "reasonably
related 10 legitimate pedagogical concerns").
68 Id. at 273 ("[W]e hold chat educators do not offend the Firsc Amendment by exercising
editorial control over the style and content o f student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.").
69 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (restricting speech that can be reasonably viewed as promoting
the illegal use of drugs).
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them that can be, and has been by some, read very expansively. 7° Fraser
could apply to all "offensive" speech; Hazelwood to any speech that
conceivably has the imprimatur o f the school; and Morse to all speech that
places the physical or emotional safety o f students at risk. 11
What emerges is a vision of high school life that may seem unduly
restrictive, but it is restrictive for a reason. And, in some respects, it
represents an inspiring and even aspirational vision. The purposes o f high
school arc many and varied: socialization, maturation, playing sports,
learning a musical instrument, etc. But high school should primarily be about
education. 12 Students are there to learn, but there are ever-present threats to
schools being able to accomplish this mission-mostly threats presented by
the students themselves. Students may have good ideas, and want to express
them. But they may also have silly or hurtful ideas, or be unaware o f how
expressing those ideas might frustrate the school's ability to accomplish its
educational mission. 11 It is the obligation of school administrators to protect
other students and their ability to learn, and also to protect students from
themselves. There is, o f course, a risk that school administrators may be too
aggressive in limiting speech. Part o f education is students saying silly things
and making mistakes; that is how learning can happen, too. But this balance-how much speech, how much regulation-is going to be made in the
context o f how to advance the school's educational mission, not how to best
promote free exchange o f ideas. The marketplace o f ideas is a means in high
school, not an end in itself.
The main way in which these issues have arisen-which require finding
the balance between restricting speech and freedom of speech-is in a series
of Confederate flag cases. 7" Circuit courts have been more than willing to
70 Judge Posner seems to sny precisely this: "From Morse and Fra.ver we infer that i f there is
renson to think that n particular cype of student speech will lend 10 n decline in students' test scores,
an upsurge in tru11ncy, or other symptoms o f a sick school . . . the school can forbid the speech."
Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008).
71 For the Inner view, sec Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1100
(S.D. Cal. 2007). affd i n part, ,,acoted i11 part, 318 F. App'x 540 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Although this
Court's review of Morse reveals that the majority made it clear its decision is limited to speech
concerning illegal drug use . . . this Court agrees with defendants th:it the re:isoning presented
in Morse lends support for n finding that the speech 111issue in the instant case may properly be
restricted by school officials i f it is co11sidcrcd harmful." (emphasis added)).
72 For an expression o f this view, see Post, supra note•, at 23-24.
73 As Judge Posner put it inn high school speech case, "(t]he contribution that kids can make
to the marketplace in ideas and opinions is modest and n school's countervailing interest in
protecting its students from offensive speech by their classmates is undeniable." Nuxoll, 523 F.3d
at 671.
74 See, e.g., Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 568-69 & 569 n.7 (6th Cir. 2008) (collecting cnses
where schools banned the display o f the Confederate flag). Sec gc11erally Fem L . Klettcr, Propriety
of Proliibitio11 <!f Display or Wcari11g of Co11fedcrate Flag, 66 A.L.R. 6th 493 (2018) (collecting
more cases). Bu" is also an exnmplc o f the extremely deferential approach many courts take when

150

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:101

find "substantial disruption" 75 to the school when students wear Confederate
flag t-shirts (or even draw a Confederate flag), provided that there has been
a history o f racial tension in the school. 76 But the standard for that "history"
has been rather variable, and courts have tended to defer to school
administrators. 77 What is notable-as a recent Ninth Circuit court case has
shown in great relief-is how the response o f the schools in these cases
basically puts into effect a heckler's veto: a situation where the disruptive
response o f others is used as the basis for restricting speech. 78 Still more
evident is the lack o f any strict requirement that violence in response to the
speech has to be imminent. 79 And over all o f these cases hangs the possibility
o f viewpoint discrimination-a challenge commonly made in lawsuits
against the schools. 8 ° Certainly, it is not too difficult to see restrictions on
Confederate flags in a school environment as a kind o f restriction on hate
speech or even a prohibition on "verbal assault." 8 1 Such overzealous
reviewing the actions of school administrators restricting expression. Barr, 538 F.3d at 574.
7S Sec supra note 64.
16 See ge11erally Alexandra Brown, Sil,mci11g the Rebel Yell: £rceptio11s to the First
Amendmellf After Defoe Ex Rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010), 37 S. ILL. U. L.J.
465, 470-73 (2013) (discussing cases where a history o f racial disruption wns relevant to decisions
banning the display of the Confederate flag).
77 See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bd. o f AlachuaCty., 324 F.3d 1246, 1247 (I Ith Cir.2003)("[Student]
rights should not interfere with a school administrator's professional observation that certain
expressions . . . could lead to an unhealthy[] and potentially unsafe learning environment . . . . Short
of n constitutional violation based on a school administrator's unsubstantiated infringement [on
student speech) . . . this Court will not interfere with the administration of a school."); see also
Hardwick v. Heyward, 674 F. Supp. 2d 725, 742 (D.S.C. 2009) (holding that school officials were
"not required nor expected 'to employ the same level of precision in drafting school disciplinary
procedures as is expected o f legislative bodies crafting criminal restrictions"').
78 Sec Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing
Tinker v. Des Moines lndcp. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,513 (1969)) ("Where speech •for any
reason . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion o f the tights
of others,' school officials may limit the speech."); see also id. ("The cases do not distinguish
between 'substantial disruption' caused by the speaker and 'substantial disruption' caused by the
reactions of onlookers or a combination of circumstances.").
79 One court hns described the test as, "whether school officials 'might reasonably portend
disruption' from the student speech at issue." Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008);
see also Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204. 523 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that
"[i]t is enough for the school to present 'facts which might reasonably lead school officials to
forecast substantial disruption.,..).
KO See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1184 (9th Cir. 2006)
(addressing student's argument that school's prohibition of his T-shirt condemning homoscituality
constituted viewpoint discrimination). This challenge is commonly rejected by courts. See id. at
I 185 (citing Scott, 324 F.3d at 1248; West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358,
1366 (10th Cir. 2000)) ("Thus, pursuant to Tinker, courts have allowed schools to ban the display
of Confederate flags despite the fact thnt such a ban may constitute viewpoint discrimination.").
RI See Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178 ("[S]tudents who may be injured by verbal assaults on the
basis of a core identifying characteristic such as race. religion, or seitual orit:nllltion, have a right to
be free from such . . . . psychological attacks that cause to question their self-worth and their rightful
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protection of student sensibilities would be badly out of place in an ordinary
public forum. In other words. these cases treat high school as a unique
context where limits on speech that would be wholly out of place in a
traditional forum are not only permitted, but are something of a
commonplace occurrence because we are dealing with kids at school.82
Surely, the instances where students are sent home, or asked to change their
shirts, are likely greater than those cases in which the students or their parents
choose to litigate.
Of course, high school administrators can make mistakes. They can
misjudge the risk ofa violent response and end up censoring harmless speech
(something that is especially worrisome given judicial deference to school
administrators). Principals and other school officials can be biased in their
decisions regarding what speech is vulgar or lewd. They may prohibit the
expression of viewpoints that are valid. which could have been the basis of
healthy debate or discussion. They might use repression when more speech
would be a better response. But our question should always be, better for
what? When a school administrator suppresses a viewpoint out of spite or
ignorance, that is a toss-and a loss in two ways. It is a loss for freedom of
expression and it is a (related) loss for sound school discipline. When,
however, an administrator disciplines a student whose speech does genuinely
represent a threat to the school-not just in terms of violence, but in terms
of the school being able to fulfill its educational mission, because of speech
that makes it difficult for students to learn, or for teachers to teach 83- then
that is fundamentally a win for the high school. It may not be the most
speech-maximizing thing for the administrator to do, but that is not the job
of the administrator, nor, more importantly, is it the job of the school. 114
Again, free speech is not the end of a high school; it is, at best, one of many
means for a high school to achieve its goal of educating its students the best
that it can.
place in society.").
82 See, e.g., NrLToll, S23 F.3d at 674-75 ("[H]igh school students ore not adults, schools ore
not public meeting halls, children arc in school to be taught by adults rather than to practice
attacking each other with wounding words, and school authorities have a protective relationship
and responsibility lo all the students.").
83 A school's educational mission can be threatened by many other things short of violence.
See, e.g., Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324,340 (6th Cir. 20 I0)(Rogcrs, J., concurring)("Racial tension
obviously interferes with lea.ming in ways that even strongly-held political views do not. Anger,
hostility, and contemptare not clements of.l sound learning strategy, or school administrators could
at least so conclude."); see also Scoll, 324 F.Jd at 1249 (holding that school administrator did not
err in banning the display o f Confederate flags on school property due to the trauma and violence
such displays may provoke).
114 Although I do not pursue the point in great detail here, it seems obvious to me that sometimes
when we limit insults and name-calling, what results is heller and more debate, not less and worse
debate.
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The mission can seem, and often is, all-encompassing. High schools
have sports teams, they have newspapers, and they have student groups. But
these are not autonomous or even semi-autonomous parts of the high school,
or at least, not ideally. They are other means the school has of fulfilling its
mission of education. The breadth of the high school experience (it includes
not just class, but also plays, bands, chess clubs, sports teams, etc.) shows us
that we should view the goal of education not only from a narrow, academic
standpoint. Schools educate in many ways, not just in the classroom. ss At the
pinnacle, however, is the actual, physical classroom, where the educational
mission is most exemplified and, when it goes well, most fulfilled The other
parts of the school are sometimes obviously subordinate to i t - a s when a
school sports star is suspended because of poor performance in the
classroom. But the classroom also acts as a sort of model for all of the other
activities that go on in the school; they are meant to be learning experiences.
It should not be the goal (or not the main goal) of a sports team to win the
state high school sports championship. It is to operate as a forum for the
education of the students on the team. Everything is subordinate to this goal.
If a school subordinated its education goals for the sake of a state swimming
championship, for instance, it would in a very real sense cease to be a school.
So too if the school decided to be a public forum, rather than an educational
i11stitutio11.

III
THE CASE FOR CONTINUITY

In the first two parts, I have painted pictures of two extremes. No
college is in fact a pure free market for ideas that has no constraints on speech
other than those that could exist in a traditional public forum-indeed, no
college or university could really be that way and claim very long that it was
an "educational institution." And no high school (at least that I am aware ot)
is so rigidly focused on education that any student who utters a word that
departs from that mission will be policed and punished if it distracts other
students from learning. We might speak instead o f te11de11cies in each level
of institution, where universities and colleges tend toward the free market
ideal and high schools tend toward the disciplinarian model. Even here there
may be exceptions, where some high schools might aspire to be more open
and some universities more closed. If we include private collegiate
institutions in the mix-those not constrained by the First Amendment-we
might see rules that are perhaps more consistent with the high school model.
Thus, we have to be careful about any generalizations.
ss And lhc reach of n school can somelimes even extend to off-campus speech that nonetheless
affects what goes on al schoo I. This is obviously II large topic that I cannot treat here.
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But even in making this point, we are on our way to seeing what is
flawed in the "break" model. If some colleges and universities are more like
high schools and some are less so, then we cannot posit a decisive break
between the nature of a high school and the nature of a university. There is
nothing intrinsic to the idea o f a university that requires it to represent a
radical break from what schools-and students-do in high school. And now
I do want to make a generalization: the transition between high school and
college is (at least, usually) one of continuity, rather than one that represents
a clean break. Consider: the first year o f high school will differ from the last
year o f high school, in the sense that students arc given more freedom, more
independence, and their ideas and debates will be taken more seriously. But
then again, the last year o f high school may be similar in many respects to
the first year o f collcge. 86 Students may need to be told the rules: that they
have to earn the right lo have their opinions taken seriously and that they
cannot act like they own the school, as they did when they were seniors in
high school. They must show up on time to class and do their homework. As
they go through college, they may gradually begin to be treated less like
students and more like citizens. The point, though, is that none of this process
occurs all at once and that the transition from high school to college and then
through college is just that: a transition where we can expect change, but also
a great deal o f continuity. The rules at play will be different, but not radically
different. 87 It will be a matter of more or less, not all or nothing. 88
Two things make it the case that there has to be some degree o f
continuity between high school and college, which in fact may be two angles
of the same phenomenon.89 First, both are dealing with stlldents. Being a
student usually connotes both that one is at an earlier stage of intellectual
development and that one is under some instruction. The former can and
usually does mean relative youth. It almost always means this as a high
&6 Sec Hosty v. Carter. 412 F.3d 73 I. 734 (7th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that the line between high
school and college is not "bright," since "many high school seniors arc older than some college
freshmen, and junior colleges are simihlr to many high schools"). This is even ignoring the
Cllistence o fjunior colleges, further blurring lines.
87 The famous line from the Fraser case, I think, hits e,mctly the right note here: "[t]he
constitutional rights o f students in public school arc not al/lomatical/y coelltcnsive with the rights
o f adults in other settings." Bclhel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (I 986)(emphasis
added).
RR For 11 lighthearted look at the similarities between high school and college, sec Lindsey
Hemenez, 10 Reasv11s Why College Is Still Exactly Like Higlr Sclwvl, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6,
2017, 11: 17 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/lindscy•hemenez/l 0-reasons-why-college•
is_b_6860830.html (noting that colleges. like high schools, have "8 a.m. classes" and "daily
homework").
K9 My argument here need not deny that there are many other asymmetries between college
and high school. C f Papandrea, s11pra note 26, at 1849-52 (describing the ways "(p]rimary and
secondary education is significantly different from higher education").
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school student-one is still considered a child in high school, or at most a
young adult. College students may be considered adults, and are adults for
many purposes under the law, 90 although they can at the same time still be
relatively immature. 91 But this gets us to the further fact that all of those in
high school and all of those in college are going there to be instructed. This
may not require that one be young in a chronological sense, but it does
connote a condition of if not ignorance, then a relative lack of knowledge.
And instruction requires some discipline. One may be left more or less free
to explore and study on one's own, but one still needs to be guided. All
students, at whatever stage of their lives, are persons who need and seek
instruction. This is a thread that connects those in high school to those in
college to those in graduate school, and even beyond. All schools have
students. 92
Second, and relatedly, schools have classes. Classes are (for better or
worse) the main vehicle for educational instruction. Classes, to work, have
to be managed well. There may be lectures in a class, and for this, there must
be attention paid to the person lecturing. Classes can also be run in a way
that accommodates discussion; in a seminar, this may be all that there is. But
even discussions need to be moderated and guided, so that some point is
reached and some lesson is learned. Debate may be, and ideally would be,
robust and uninhibited, but within limits. A robust and uninhibited debate
about Chaucer should not involve attacks on China's foreign policy because
those are not helpful-they distract from, rather than contribute to, the
educational focus of the discussion. This applies to both form and content,
as students learn to engage one another civilly, rather than make ad hominem
attacks.93 Classes may be more or less rigidly managed, but they must in
some sense be managed, both day to day and as a whole: grades are usually
given out as measures of how well someone did in learning the lessons. This
90 Sec id. at 1849 (arguing that if individuals over eighteen arc allowed lo vote and engage in
free speech, they should also have to endure offensive speech).
91 The question. again. is one of degree-as in, more or less mature, rather than "mature" and
"not mature." Sec, e.g., Widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,289 n.14 (1981)("University students
arc, of course, young adults. They arc less impressionable tlmn younger students and should be able
to appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion.").
92 Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733 (6th Cir. 2012) ("The Ha:e/ll'ood test . . . arose in the
context o f speech by high school students, not . . . college or graduate students. But for the same
reason this test works for students who have not yet entered high school . . . it works for students
who have graduated from high school. The key word is sh1de111." (emphasis added) (citing Cuny v.
Hcnsiner, 513 F.3d 570, 577-78 (6th Cir. 2008) (elementary school); Settle v. Dickson Cty. Sch.
Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 153 (6th Cir. 1995) (junior high school)).
9l West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1233-34 (D. Kan. 1998)
("Part of a public school's essential mission must be to teach students of differing races, creeds and
colors to engage each other in civil terms rather than in 'tenns of debate highly olTcnsive or highly
threatening to others."').
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too is a form o f institutional control, and grades can and do act as both an
incentive and as a sanction to those whose views do not show that they have
actually learned anything. Again, the standards may shift and change as one
goes from high school to college; the standards may get higher, lower, or
become looser. But there must always be standards, if education is to have
any substance.
As mentioned previously, the fact that schools have students and classes
may be two ways of getting at the same thing. The goal of schools is
education.9-1 Classes are the medium o f that education, and students are the
object. What those students and classes arc like will be different, but they
will not be radically different-at least not i f universities are to remain
schools. Students in college will be more mature and can be trusted more to
learn on their own. 95 Classes in college should be more receptive to student
speech, because students in college will tend, as a general matter, to have
more and better things to say than high schoolers. And the college
environment may be-deliberately-less totalizing. Universities may
sponsor student groups, as may high schools, but universities may give those
groups greater autonomy. Those groups may have advisors, but the function
o f the advisor may be very different in the college or university case than in
the high school case. A college newspaper will be run (and controlled) very
differently than a high school newspaper will. But, as stated above, these are
all points along a continuum-it is not as if a college all o f a sudden does not
have students or classes, and instead has only citizens and a public forum.
The college or university has an overall mission and structure, and that
structure dictates that there be some constraints i f education is going to
happen. 96
On the continuity view, the relevant standards for educational
94 For an eloquent meditation on the nature of higher education, see generally ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, EDUCATION'S END: WHY OUR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES HAVE GIVEN UP ON THE
MEANING OF LIFE (2007) (cmphnsizing that the key question at the center of all higher educntion
should be: Whnt is the meaning o f life?).
95 Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ. Torrance Unified Sch. Dist., 682 F.2d 8S8, 863 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982)
(reasoning thnt different considerations govern the application o f the First Amendment, depending
on the level of institution because of students' age, immaturity. and susceptibility); Charles Alan
Wright, The Co1u1i111tio11 011 the Ca111p11s, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1052-S3 ( 1969).
96 This is something that the Supreme Court seemed generally nwarc of in its recent decision
in Christia11 Legal Society. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of California, Hastings Coll.
o f the Law v. Martinez, 56! U.S. 661, 685-86 (2010) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 273 ( 1988); Bd. o f Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 ( 1982): Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169, 180 ( 1972)) (reasoning that judges should not substitute their own judgment for that of
school ndministrators because the court's inquiry is dependent on the educational context and
particular characteristics o f the school environment). Significant here. too. is the fact that in dealing
with a university, the Court felt free to cite from cases that dealt with high schools. i.e., the Tinker
line o f cases.
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institutions are precisely those that are found in the Tinker quartet o f cases,
with the significant caveat that the doctrine has to be adjusted to fit the needs
and characteristics o f students in college. 97 There should be a higher
threshold for when disruptive speech can be prohibited and punished. What
counts as "vulgar" should be greatly reduced in scope. The need for intensive
faculty control and supervision o f student publications and student groups
should be relaxed. 98 There may be more room for genuine "off campus"
student speech and behavior. However, there is a great difference between
saying that these standards should be different and saying that these
standards do not apply at all-that the relevant standards are the ones we use
for regulating public forums. This misunderstands what a university is,
which is a place for students to take classes and to leam. 99 It is in the context
o f this educational mission, and not an abstract ideal o f freedom o f speech,
that decisions about campus speech need to be made. To hold that the
relevant aspiration is freedom o f speech misconstrues the place o f speech in
a university, or for that matter, in any school. Tolerating a wide variety o f
speech frequently is a very good way to advance the mission o f education:
students need to be free to voice their opinions, and to hear the opinions o f
others. For that matter,facu/ty need to hear those opinions and need to be
challenged so that they do not become mere appendages o f the status quo. 100
Leaming often happens best in an environment where there is frank and open
discussion. But that this happens sometimes does not mean it always
happens; nor does it mean that frank and open discussion should be unlimited
and unchecked. Sometimes, shutting down an opinion or a conversation can

97 See. e.g., Walker-Serrano v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412,416 (3d Cir. 2003) ("But any analysis
o f the students' rights to expression on the one hand, and of schools' need to control behavior and
foster an environment conducive 10 learning on the other, must necessarily take into account the
age and maturity of the student.").
98 Although this is an open question. One might think that as students mature, the need for
more aggressive standards i11creases rather than decreases. What would pass for an A in high school
might be grounds for dismissal in a graduate program. See, e.g., Brown v. Li, 308 F.Jd 939, 951
(9th Cir. 2002) ("The Supreme Coun's jurisprudence docs not hold that an institution's interest in .
. . limiting a student's speech to that which is germane to a panicular academic assignment
diminishes as students age. Indeed, arguably the need for academic discipline and editorial rigor
increases as a student's learning progresses.").
qq It also misunderstands the stakes; with public forums, the stakes can sometimes rise to the
level o f criminal sanctions. With school discipline, we are talking (at most) of expulsion. Justice
Rehnquist drew the contrust in his dissent in Papis/1: "[A] wooden insistence on equating, for
constitutional purposes, the authority of the Slllte to criminally punish with its authority to exercise
even a modicum o f control over the university which it operates, serves neither the Constitution
nor public education well." Pnpish v. Bd. of Curators orthc Univ. o f Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 677 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See ulso Rehnquist's dissent in Hea{v, which makes the same point at
somewhat greater length. Healy, 480 U.S at 203.
100 As Justice Douglas emphasized in his concurring opinion in Hea{1•, 480 U.S. at 197.
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also advance the educational prospects of all students. wi That these are
difficult decisions that require a lot of judgment docs not mean that
restrictions on speech should never happen. They happen all the time in high
schools. 102 And school administrators will sometimes make mistakes in
deciding to come down hard on some speech. Their job, however, is not to
be protectors of free speech in an unregulated marketplace: Their goal is to
make the school a place where learning can happen. Universities and
university officials should-by all means-be mindful of the good of free
speech. but that good needs to be seen in context. It is a relative good, not an
absolute one, and when that good conflicts with the overarching purpose of
the school, free speech can and should be limited.
CONCLUSION

My conclusion is in some respects a very modest one. I am not making
any claim about how university administrators should react in the face of,
say, an invitation made by a student group to a right-wing speaker. These, as
I remarked at the conclusion of the previous part, will be matters of
administrative judgment. They will be resolved, in large part, in connection
with how the university understands what its mission is. 103 1, of course, have
my own opinions about particular cases and about how to approach them.
But my argument is also, in other ways, immodest. I have maintained that
the best way to look at university First Amendment cases is not by treating
universities as akin to public forums, but by treating them as schools. This
means not applying cases about hate speech, true threats, or incitement from
public forum cases. Rather, it means translating cases like Tinker to
education at all levels, and not just in high school and below. As I have
emphasized, this should not entail a straight application of high school cases
like Tinker to colleges. 11" ' High school students and classes are in many ways
obviously different from college and university classes-and graduate level
101 See supra notes 84 & 93.
1o2 C f supra nolc 71 (describing case in which the judiciary upheld restrictions to speech in
school for speech that was offensive and harmful).
103 Rodney Smolla seems to me to ask many of the right questions. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla,
Academic Freedom. Hate Speech, and tire Idea o f a U11ii•ersiry, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195,
223-24 ( 1990) ("Might not the university say that part of its legitimate mission is to teach students
how to contend vigorously within the marketplace o f ideas while nevertheless observing certain
norms o f civility?'").
1o.i For some good examples of courts recognizing this point (although with very different
outcomes), see Tatro v. U11iversity o f Afin11esota, 800 N.W.2d 811, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011)
(holding that the Tinker line of cases should be applied to universities in such a way that recognizes
thnt "a substantial disruption inn primary school may look very different inn university") and Doe
v. Rector & Visitors o f George Maso11 Unfrersi v. 149 F. Supp. 3d 602, 627 (E.D. Va. 2016)
(holding that Ti11kcr should be applied to universities in a way that accounts for institutional
differences between universities and secondary schools).
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classes are more different still. 11►5 But there is no radical break, as seems
suggested by many commentators and sometimes, even the Supreme
Court. 10 6 Universities, at the end of the day, are schools, and the law
regarding schools is what we should be applying to them. 10 7

1OS As one court put it in a case involving classroom speech at the University of Utah: "Although
we are applying Ha=elwuod to n university context, we are not unmindful of the differences in
marurity between university and high school students. Age, maturity, and sophistication level o f
the students will be factored in determining whether the restriction is 'reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns."' Axson-Flynn v. Johnson. 356 F.3d 1277, 1289-90 (10th Cir.
2004) (citing Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448,453 (1st Cir. 1993)).
I06 As in the Heu(v and Papisli cases. See s11pra note 50 nnd nccompnnying text.
107 The movement to make all university spaces "public forums" by legislative fiat in a wny
proves my point-and strikes me as a troubling trend. Sec, e.g., Andrew Blake, Florida lawmakers
Ba11 'Free Speecli Zo11es' 011 College Ca111p11ses, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018),
https:!/www.washingtontimcs.com/news/2018/mar/6/llorida-l
awmakcrs-ban-frce-spcech-zonescollcge-ca/. I f all university spaces were already public forums through and through, there would
be no need for legislation o f this son.

